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Abstract
We use a nationally representative survey to investigate the incidence of discrimination
against internal migrant workers in urban China, considering both migrants from rural
areas (rural migrants) and those from other urban areas (urban migrants). We find that
both rural and urban migrants are discriminated out of jobs with formal labour
contracts. Results also suggest that urban migrants are compensated for working in the
informal sector by earning higher wages. There is evidence however of wage
discrimination against rural hukou status. A semi-parametric method suggests a larger
discrimination against migrants in the upper half of the wage distribution.
Discrimination against migrants seems not to decrease as their duration of stay in the
urban labour market increases.
JEL codes: J7; J51; O15; N35
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1 Introduction
Institutional reform, a wide and increasing rural-urban income gap1 and the easing of
internal migration restrictions, have contributed to attracting millions of workers to the
fast-growing urban centres of China since the early 1980s (Cai 2000). Between 1990 and
2005 more than 100 million individuals migrated from rural to urban areas (MGI 2009)
and the stock of internal migrants was estimated at 150 million in 2009 (Meng and Zhang
2010).2 According to the 1% Chinese population survey, rural migrant workers accounted
for more than 20% of the labour force in the urban labour market in 2005. Previous anal-
yses shed little doubt as to whether this influx of labour helped fill labour shortages and
spur economic growth (Liang 2001; Song and Zhang 2003). The literature is more divided
as to the welfare of these migrant workers.
Research on China shows that internal migrants disproportionately take up informal
sector jobs, earn less and are less likely to be covered by a social safety net (see for instance
the China Labor Bulletin (2008)). The situation is exacerbated by the residence regis-
tration system (hukou), which largely determines one’s access to local public goods and
services. The hukou system has generated a dualistic labour market in which migrants
can be discriminated on income but also on the type of jobs they have access to. To
© Gagnon et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction




Gagnon et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 2 of 23
draw inference on the existence and extent of discrimination, however, researchers need
to consider the fact that migrant workers have different characteristics than urban res-
idents, such as lower education levels. To what extent their disproportional presence in
the informal sector and lower income are due to lower human capital level is an empirical
question that has generated a lot of attention. At present, there seems to be no consen-
sus on the extent of discrimination against migrant workers in the Chinese urban labour
market.
The literature investigating discrimination against rural migrants mainly focuses on
wages. Such an approach is incomplete, since other benefits are associated with one’s
hukou status. These benefits not only include those provided by employers and pensions,
but also local public services (education, medical services, and housing), the access to
which depends heavily on having a good job. While employer-provided non-wage ben-
efits can be empirically accounted for to some extent, it is hard to monetarize the value
associated with local public services. One way to deal with this issue is to look at the
distribution of formal and informal jobs, since they often determine access to non-wage
benefits in one’s job.
This paper investigates the incidence of discrimination against internal migrants in
urban China using the 2005 Chinese Population Survey, a large nationally representa-
tive dataset. It questions whether their disproportionate presence in the informal labour
market is due to discrimination or to their lower human capital levels. Counterfactual
empirical results show that if migrants (both rural and urban) were treated as urban resi-
dents (based on observable characteristics), there would be more with formal sector jobs.
An Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (OB, Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) based on a linear
probability model of having an informal sector job suggests that a sizable share of the gap
between migrant workers and urban residents cannot be explained by the differences in
their observable characteristics, suggesting discrimination out of the formal sector against
migrant workers.
The paper then turns to the income gap. An OB decomposition, based on a standard
OLS wage regression for each group, suggests that most of the income gap between rural
migrants and urban residents can be explained by differences in observed characteristics,
which is consistent with recent studies. However, it would be misleading to draw the con-
clusion that rural migrants are not discriminated against in the urban labourmarket. First,
the typical type of job each group holds is different. Even at similar income levels, urban
residents are more likely to have jobs in the formal sector than migrant workers, which
are more stable and associated with better social security coverage andmany benefits that
are hard to monetarize. Second, discrimination might vary across the income distribu-
tion. This cannot be captured by a simple OB decomposition, which only decomposes the
income gaps in means.
We therefore do two additional exercises. First, we exploit the fact that the hukou sys-
tem has two components. One is the agricultural and non-agricultural division (or rural
vs. urban), and the other is the specific location in which a hukou is registered. We intro-
duce urban migrants into the analysis as a new reference group for rural migrants, as
they have an urban hukou but are not registered in the location in which they are work-
ing. We find that urban migrants, on average, earn more than both urban residents and
rural migrants. Since urban migrants differ from urban residents only in migrant status,
we interpret any unexplained components of the decomposition as a premium associated
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with migration. This premium can also be interpreted as compensation for the loss of
hukou-related benefits. This is consistent with the fact that urban migrants give up var-
ious benefits associated with a local hukou registration, which must be compensated
for when they migrate. Incomes must therefore be higher for urban migrants as long
as they have the freedom to choose the location in which they work. Urban migrants
are a more appropriate group to study income discrimination against rural migrants,
because urban local benefits have been monetarized for urban migrants at least to some
extent.3
As urbanmigrants and rural migrants differ only in hukou status, we interpret the unex-
plained component of the decomposition as discrimination against rural hukou status. By
comparing urban migrants with both rural migrants and urban residents, results suggest
that the presumed absence of income discrimination against rural migrants is in fact the
net effect of a discrimination against a rural hukou status and a premium accrued by both
rural and urban migrants in the labour market.
Second, we deepen the decomposition analysis using the semi-parametric approach
proposed by DiNardo et al. (1996) to explain the income gap along its entire distribution.
Results suggest that discrimination against migrant workers occurs in the upper half of
the income distribution.
We also take into account duration in the urban labour market. When the groups of
migrants are divided according to whether they have spent more or less than 5 years in a
location other than the one in which their hukou is registered, duration does not matter
in alleviating discrimination against migrant workers.
This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it uses a dataset
which has advantages in identifying a nationally representative migrant sample. Second, it
applies an OBmethod to decompose the gap betweenmigrant and non-migrant groups in
the likelihood of working in the formal or informal sector. It is worth mentioning that the
Brown et al. (1980) method takes sectoral distribution into consideration in its decom-
position analysis. However, if the income gap between different sectors is small, taking
the sectoral distribution into consideration will not change the results of the simple OB
decomposition of the income gaps.4 Given the fact that the formal/informal dimension
is important in its own right, we perform a simple OB decomposition to investigate the
gap in formal/informal sector distributions between migrants and non-migrants. Third,
it applies a non-parametric analysis of the wage distribution, rather than investigating
differences in means. Fourth, it considers an additional group of individuals, namely
migrants with urban (or non-agricultural) hukou status. This groupmakes up a large share
of the work force in the Chinese urban labour market, but is neglected in many stud-
ies. Adding this group into the analysis helps better identify discrimination along the two
dimensions of the hukou system: local vs. non-local and rural vs. urban (or agricultural
vs. non-agricultural).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a short discussion of the institu-
tional context and a literature review of migrant labour outcomes in the Chinese urban
labour market. Section 3 describes the 2005 1% population survey microdataset used in
this paper. Section 4 presents and discusses the model specification and Section 5 reports
empirical results, where rural migrants are compared not only with urban residents but
also with urban migrants, both in terms of wages and the sectors in which they work.
Section 6 discusses policy implications and concludes.
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2 The hukou system and the Chinese urban labour market
The institutional framework in which the Chinese urban labour market operates has
been covered extensively, with particular attention being placed on the residential reg-
istration (hukou) system see (Cai 2000; Deng and Gustafsson 2006; Zhao 2005). This
system was originally designed in the 1950s to control migration within the country
by registering household members in designated rural or urban locations. In prac-
tice, one’s hukou status is categorized by both socio-economic eligibility (agricultural
vs. non-agricultural) and registered residential location (local vs. non-local) Chan and
Buckingham (2008). The first classification determines entitlement to state subsidized
food grain and other prerogatives. The second classification defines one’s rights to
many benefits (access to health care, public education, housing, and better access to
jobs) in a specific locality. Hukou status is determined by birth, following the sta-
tus held by one’s parents. To migrate permanently, one needs to change registration
location.
The lack of access to social benefits in one’s job is likely to contribute to an important
decrease in welfare; a report by the China Labor Bulletin (2008), for instance, reported
that the current wage gap between urban and rural regions would increase from 3- to 6-
fold in real terms, if the benefits accrued from social security were considered. Due to
significant differences in employment opportunities and welfare and benefit entitlements,
there is a strong incentive for rural residents to change their hukou registration from agri-
cultural to non-agricultural, which requires approval from the state. Both the process and
the number of such moves are tightly controlled by the government. Temporary migrants
who cannot change registration location also need official approval to move. To migrate
without authorization, people are vulnerable to round-ups and deportation, and cannot
access many other local rights.
Despite the system, growth in the manufacturing (export) sector in China over the last
twenty years has attracted a significant number of migrant workers to fast-growing urban
centres. Policy makers both of the central and local governments have since faced a sig-
nificant challenge in integrating new arrivals. hukou policies have become increasingly
flexible since the 1980s. A major change was the decentralisation of the system’s manage-
ment, with many local governments obtaining full managerial power to determine their
own policies towards migrants. It has also become easier for workers and households to
transfer their registrations to other locations (in particular to small and medium-sized
cities), and temporary residence permits are being granted more often. Notably, it has
become possible for people to migrate and obtain a job without a valid permit. This
paper focuses on migrants who have not changed their hukou status, since those that
have changed it cannot be identified in the Chinese Population Survey. This group is
nevertheless, very small.
Deliberate discrimination of migrants in cities remained legal until very recently, with
the aim of reducing competition in urban centres (Cai 2000) and avoiding the creation of
slums common in big countries urbanising in a relatively short period of time. Migrants
are less likely to access good jobs and earn less on average than non-migrants (Zhao 2005).
Local public services remain either inaccessible or expensive for them. Although rural
migrants (those with an agricultural hukou status) may stay for long periods in urban
areas, most are not covered by the urban social security system nor entitled to various
other social and economic benefits. It is also worthmentioning that most of these benefits
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are determined by the specific location in which the hukou is registered, meaning that
migrants from other urban areas also face such problems.
Earlier studies on China using OB decompositions or related methods find some evi-
dence of discrimination against rural migrants in the urban labour market. For instance,
Meng and Zhang (2001) find that 51% of the wage gap between urban residents and
migrants is due to unexplained factors, while Dinh and Maurer-Fazio (2004) find 25%,
Wang (2005) 43% and Deng (2007) 60%. These findings are challenged by more recent
studies. Using the 2002 China Household Income Project data, both Démurger et al.
(2009) and Messinis (2013) find that the main source of disparity between urban res-
idents and rural migrants is related to pre-market variables (education opportunities)
rather than those directly related to the performance in the labour market. Using the 2005
China Urban Labor Survey (CULS),5 Lee (2012) finds that there is only a small amount
of discrimination between migrant and urban workers in terms of wages. However, when
total labour remuneration is taken into account, the extent of the discrimination against
migrant workers is larger. It is still difficult to put a monetary value on many of the
hukou-related benefits, which include access to local public schools, medical services, and
secure and decent jobs. Existing studies do not take into consideration these benefits.
They also use data from different regions at different times and ultimately derive different
conclusions, making any comparison a difficult task (Zhao 2005).
In comparison to existing literature, this paper uses a national dataset with better cover-
age of migrants at a similar moment in time. It also investigates differences beyond wages,
looking at differences in the probability of having an informal job. Finally it investigates
differences not only at the mean but across the whole wage distribution.
3 Data and summary statistics
Data used in this analysis come from a one-fifth random draw of the 2005 1% population
survey, which is administered by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The
sample size of around 2.3 million individuals covers 31 provinces, municipalities, and
autonomous regions, and is representative of mainland China. The sample studied in this
analysis includes individuals aged from 16 to 60 and who are not currently in school.
Employers, household workers, and observations with no or zero declared income are
also not considered.
The 2005 Chinese Population Survey has advantages for studying migrant labour mar-
ket outcomes relative to household surveys. An ordinary household survey may be less
likely to obtain a representative sample of migrants due to the floating nature of migrants
and due to its inherent sampling process. For example, surveys that base their sampling
frame on neighbourhoods and communities may under-represent migrants who arrived
recently and do not live in registered housing and those who live at the construction site
collectively. Census data does not suffer from such problems, since it aims at covering the
entire population. It therefore provides a good coverage of the migrant population within
China - including the floating population.
This paper focuses solely on individuals working in urban areas. The area in which
an individual is currently residing or working is classified into three categories in the
survey: city, town, and village. In this analysis, city and town are defined as urban areas
and villages are defined as rural areas. These definitions are consistent with those used by
the NBS to produce rural and urban statistics.6
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Two questions in the questionnaire are used to identify migrants in the urban labour
market: (1) In which location is your hukou registered? and (2) How long ago did you leave
this location? Migrants are defined as those who have left their registered hukou location
for more than six months. Another question asks the type of hukou (agricultural or non-
agricultural) and helps divide migrants further into two categories. As individuals with an
agricultural hukou usually come from rural areas, we refer to this group as rural migrants.
Similarly, we refer to migrants with non-agricultural hukou as urban migrants as most of
them come from other urban areas, and refer to residents who have local urban hukou as
urban residents.
In addition, the questionnaire asks the reason for migrating. Most migrants said they
had moved for work, and this is especially true for rural migrants (the share is approxi-
mately 61%). We restrict our sample to those who migrated for work or business-related
reasons. The definitions of informal employment are based on an individual’s declared
employment status and the availability of a formal labour contract, consistent with the
standard ILO guidelines (ILO 1993, 2003). The possible answers as to one’s employment
status include the following: employee, employer (who employs other persons), self-
employed (who are neither employed by others nor do they employ others) and household
worker. Only employees and the self-employed are retained for the analysis.
Those declaring themselves to be self-employed are categorised as being part of the
informal sector. Employees were then further divided depending on their declared con-
tract status, which had the following possible answers: fixed term contract, no fixed term
contract (long term contract) and no contract. Individuals answering that they do not
have a contract are considered to have informal sector jobs, while those answering that
they have a contract, regardless of whether it is fixed or not, are considered to have for-
mal sector jobs. Although it is required by law that the employees and employers sign
a contract, many employees do not have contracts due to lack of inspection and poor
enforcement.7 These two definitions of informal employment (self-employment and the
absence of a formal labour contract) are mutually exclusive. They provide a certain degree
of heterogeneity within the informal sector, yet both are characterised by the lack of social
security coverage.
Income data is captured using income earned in the previous month. In cases where
income was not earned monthly, respondents were asked to calculate a monthly income.
To calculate the hourly income, we divide the monthly income bymonthly working hours,
calculated as hours worked last week × 4. Educational level was divided into four levels,
following ISCED standards: (1) primary and below, (2) junior middle, (3) senior middle,
and (4) college and above.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1. There are 219712 urban residents, 94621
rural migrants, and 22214 urban migrants in our analysis, accounting for 65%, 28%, and
7% of the whole sample, respectively. Compared to migrant workers, urban residents are
older, primarily married and relatively highly educated. Self-employed workers are typi-
cally older than the other groups, less educated, and male, while showing higher incomes
than workers without a formal contract.
In terms of wages, urban migrants earn the most of the three groups, followed by urban
residents and rural migrants, who earn about half of the hourly wage of urban migrants.
Rural migrants are the most likely not to have a formal labour contract, with a share of
about 48%, followed by urban migrants (34%) and finally urban residents (30%). Both
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Total Formal contract Self-employed Without contract
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. urban residents
Age 38.0 38.3 39.1 37.2
Education levels (%)
Primary and below 5.7 3.8 14.6 6.0
Junior middle school 30.1 24.1 52.6 33.0
Senior middle school 33.9 35.7 28.5 32.4
College and above 30.3 36.4 4.3 28.6
Female (%) 41.8 41.4 37.1 44.4
Not married (%) 12.0 11.5 6.7 15.2
Left the hukou within 0.5–5 years - - - -
Monthly income (Yuan) 1133.1 1286.5 857.9 940.2
Hourly income (Yuan) 6.6 7.6 4.3 5.4
No unemployment insurance (%) 55.4 36.0 94.1 78.3
No pension (%) 37.3 19.1 78.5 56.9
No medical insurance (%) 36.3 18.9 81.7 52.6
Obs. 219712 128509 25832 65371
B. rural migrants
Age 30.2 28.8 35.7 29.2
Education levels (%)
Primary and below 19.6 12.6 30.4 20.8
Junior middle school 62.5 62.9 57.2 64.2
Senior middle school 15.9 21.3 11.6 13.6
College and above 1.9 3.2 0.7 1.4
Female (%) 41.4 45.2 29.3 43.1
Not married (%) 36.5 43.4 8.5 41.7
Left the hukou within 0.5–5 years 73.1 73.9 60.4 77.1
Monthly income (Yuan) 997.9 1144.7 994.0 892.2
Hourly income (Yuan) 4.8 5.7 4.6 4.2
No unemployment insurance (%) 92.9 82.8 99.5 97.9
No pension (%) 85.8 66.8 97.7 95.3
No medical insurance (%) 82.5 62.2 94.9 92.7
Obs. 94621 32947 16536 45138
C. urbanmigrants
Age 31.8 31.3 36.6 30.5
Education levels (%)
Primary and below 4.6 2.4 9.8 5.5
Junior middle school 29.4 20.3 45.7 36.4
Senior middle school 36.5 36.7 33.6 37.3
College and above 29.5 40.6 10.8 20.7
Female (%) 41.1 40.2 35.2 45.0
Not married (%) 36.7 39.4 10.7 43.9
Left the hukou within 0.5–5 years 70.3 69.5 62.7 74.7
Monthly income (Yuan) 1688.5 2090.2 1351.6 1218.0
Hourly income (Yuan) 9.3 11.9 6.8 6.5
No unemployment insurance (%) 71.8 53.7 94.4 89.7
No pension (%) 57.0 34.5 80.6 81.2
No medical insurance (%) 59.6 37.5 85.4 82.5
Obs. 22214 11482 3272 7460
Source: 1% population survey of China (2005).
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rural and urban migrants are more likely to be self-employed than urban residents, and
self-employed workers have higher incomes than workers without a formal contract.
The data also show that more urban residents have formal labour contracts, relative to
migrants. It is also evident from the data that migrants are less covered by social security
benefits, since they generally have informal sector jobs that do not include unemployment
insurance, pension benefits, or medical coverage.
4 OB and DFL decompositions
The methodology for this paper is based on two decomposition models, one based on the
probability of having an informal sector job and the other on incomes.
We first investigate differences between the three groups in the probability of having
an informal sector job. Three multinomial logit models are estimated, one for each group
(rural migrants, urban residents, and urban migrants), with the dependent variable being
a categorical variable representing each type of job, and a set of control variables. Types
of job are defined as:j = formal jobs, self-employment, and jobs without a formal labour
contract, with the latter two representing the informal sector. The results of these models
are used to calculate counterfactual shares of each employment sector for each migrant
group as if they were treated as another group.
Because the OB decomposition method requires two groups instead of three, a linear
probability model (LPM) is then estimated to identify the main factors associated with
having an informal sector job:
Prob g(inf = 1|X) = Xgi βg (1)
where inf is a binary variable that equals one if an individual has a job in the informal
sector. Superscript g = (ur; rm;um) refers to urban residents, rural migrants and urban
migrants.Xgi is a vector of control variables, including education, age, age squared, marital
status, gender, and provincial dummies.
We then compute OB decompositions for the gaps in formal-informal sector distribu-
tions between different groups g based on the results derived from ¯Probg(inf = 1) =
X¯g βˆg , with ¯Probg(inf = 1) and X¯ referring to sample means, and βˆg representing the
OLS estimates of βg . The OB model comparing urban residents and rural migrants, for
instance, would be as follows:
¯Probu(inf = 1) − ¯Probm(inf = 1) = (X¯u − X¯m) βˆu + (βˆu − βˆm) X¯m (2)
The second term on the right-hand side,
(
X¯u − X¯m) βˆu, represents the gap in probability





X¯m, measures the relative gap in probability due to unexplained
factors. Discrimination, according to the OB literature, is assumed to be the unexplained
difference in the regression coefficients.8
We then turn to income gaps. The OB decomposition method is also applied to decom-
pose the income gaps between different groups, replacing ¯Probg(inf = 1) by income levels
W¯ . In addition, we decompose the income gaps in the whole distribution. The income
distribution for different groups g is modelled as follows:
θ g(W ) =
∫
f g(W |X)φg(X)dX (3)
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where θ g(W ) is the distribution of income for group g, f g(W |X) is the conditional dis-
tribution, and φg(X) is the distribution of X for group g. To decompose the difference in
income distributions between rural migrants and urban residents, for example, we need
to construct a counterfactual distribution:9
θ cf (W ) =
∫
f u(W |X)φm(X)dX (4)
which is a combination of the characteristics of the migrants and the wage structure for
urban residents. We define a real-valued functional, v(θ(.)), that can be thought of as a
set of rules mapping different distributions θ(.) to different real numbers. The v(.) can be
a rule calculating various statistical measures of θ(.), such as variance, Theil indices, and




) − v (θm) = [v (θu) − v (θ cf )] + [v (θ cf ) − v (θm)] (5)
We can then decompose any functional of the distribution into explained and unex-
plained parts. This exercise would be identical to the OB decomposition if we considered
the difference in means.
DiNardo et al. (1996) point out that the counterfactual distribution in equation (5) can
be constructed through a re-weighting method by doing the following. First, run a probit
model with both rural migrants and urban residents with the dependent variable being
an indicator for urban residents (yes=1/no=0) and the same set of control variables as
before. Second, calculate a weighted variable ρˆ = (1 − pˆ)/pˆ based on the probability
of being an urban resident (pˆ) from the results of the probit model. Third, estimate the
distribution function using the observations of urban residents and the weighted variable
ρˆ.
The weighted variable plays a fundamental role. Since rural migrants are less educated,
observations of urban residents with lower education levels will be given more weight so
that we can get closer to the characteristic distribution of rural migrants. The probability
of a less educated individual being an urban resident (pˆ) is relatively lower and the weight
assigned is therefore relatively higher.
An alternative approach to construct the counterfactual distribution is based on
quantile regressions (the QR approach). This paper uses the DFL approach as it is
computationally faster.10
5 Empirical results
5.1 Discrimination out of formal sector jobs
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients associated with the probability of having an
informal sector job for each group using a multinomial logit model. Education has a con-
sistently significant impact on the type of job one has, with highly educated workers
having a lower probability of working in informal sectors. Table 3 presents a counterfac-
tual exercise providing the distribution of each group by type of job as if they had similar
coefficients as their counterparts. Using the coefficients estimated for urban residents
(as reported in the first two columns, Table 2), more rural migrants would have formal
labour contracts (from 35% to 47%), the share of those without contracts would decrease
by about the same amount while the share of the self-employed would largely remain
unchanged. Urban migrants also seem to face discrimination out of the formal sector, but













Table 2Marginal effects of multinomial logit regressions
Urban residents Rural migrants Urbanmigrants
Self-employed Without contract Self-employed Without contract Self-employed Without contract
Age -0.007 -0.100*** 0.143*** -0.022*** 0.140*** -0.078***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.020) (0.013)
Age2 -0.000 0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000*** -0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.225*** 0.114*** -0.543*** -0.143*** -0.111** 0.109***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.023) (0.015) (0.046) (0.032)
Junior middle school -0.537*** -0.098*** -0.563*** -0.497*** -0.463*** -0.342***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.022) (0.094) (0.085)
Senior middle school -1.509*** -0.521*** -1.037*** -0.971*** -1.180*** -0.923***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.037) (0.027) (0.095) (0.084)
College and above -3.449*** -0.694*** -1.847*** -1.412*** -2.234*** -1.600***
(0.039) (0.024) (0.104) (0.055) (0.105) (0.087)
Unmarried -0.475*** 0.121*** -1.103*** 0.059** -0.780*** 0.203***
(0.035) (0.020) (0.042) (0.024) (0.081) (0.047)
N 219712 94621 22214
Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Samples include individuals aged 16–60 years and who are out of school.
Observations of migrants who migrated for reasons not related to employment were dropped.
The base category in the multinomial logit is formal employment.
Regional dummies are included in the regressions but not reported.
Standard errors are reported below coefficients.

















Table 3 Sectoral Distributions based onMultinomial Logit Regression Results
Actual distributions (%) Predicted distributions (%)
Urban residents Rural migrants Urbanmigrants Rural migrants Urbanmigrants Urban residents Urbanmigrants Urban residents Rural migrants
As urban residents As rural migrants As urbanmigrants
Formal contract 58 35 52 47 57 38 44 47 39
Self-employed 12 17 15 17 11 26 16 22 18
Without contract 30 48 34 36 32 36 40 30 43
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: The sample includes those aged 16–60 years old and who are out of school.
Observations with no or zero income declared were dropped.
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there would bemore of them in the formal sector (57% rather than 52%), and fewer in self-
employment (11% rather than 15%). If instead urban migrants had the same coefficients
as rural migrants, there would be fewer urban migrants in the formal sector (from 52%
to 44%) and more workers without formal labour contracts (from 34% to 40%), indicating
potential discrimination against rural hukou status.
To further investigate the incidence of discrimination in the type of job one has, the
probability of having an informal sector job is estimated using a linear probability model,
and the decomposition results are reported in Table 4. The results in panel A are cal-
culated based on the counterfactual probability X¯mβˆu, while those in panel B based on
X¯uβˆm. In the first three columns of panel A, the total sample is divided by formal and
informal jobs, the latter including self-employment and jobs without formal labour con-
tracts. First, the gap in the share of workers having an informal sector job between rural
migrants and urban residents is large. The share of rural migrants having an informal sec-
tor job is 34 percentage points higher than that of urban residents. TheOB decomposition
result shows that only 17% of the difference can be explained by differences in observed
characteristics, while 83% is unexplained. Using different counterfactual probabilities
(panel B) gives similar results (14% explained and 86% unexplained).
The difference in the probability of having an informal sector job between urban
migrants and urban residents is smaller than it is for rural migrants (17% vs. 34%). How-
ever, 83% of the difference is also unexplained despite the fact that urban migrants enjoy
the highest average income level. Thus, the results suggest significant discrimination
against both types of migrants out of formal sector jobs. Observed characteristics explain
a relatively larger share (around 50%) of the probability of having an informal sector job
when rural migrants are compared to urban migrants. However, half of the difference
is nevertheless due to unexplained factors and we interpret this as evidence of some
discrimination against rural hukou status.
Using the same method, we also decompose the gaps in the probability of being self-
employed (columns 4–6) or without a formal contract (columns 7–9), the results also
indicate discrimination against both rural and urbanmigrant workers out of formal sector
jobs.
5.2 Income discrimination against rural migrants, revisited
5.2.1 OB decomposition results
We then run straightforward OLS income regressions on the determinants of hourly
incomes by type of job (formal work, self-employment and without a formal labour con-
tract) for each type of worker (urban residents, rural migrants, urban migrants). Controls
include age, age squared, four levels of education,marital status and gender and the results
are presented in Table 5.11
There are significant differences in the coefficients of each group. The returns to edu-
cation, for example, are generally higher for urban residents than for rural migrants (see
panels A and B). As for urban migrants (panel C), the returns to education are lower
than those for urban residents, but higher than those for rural migrants. Within each
group in panels A, B, and C, the returns to education are the highest for formal contract
jobs, followed by the jobs without contracts, and then the self-employed. Incomes also
differ according to gender, marital status, and age. Earnings for women are significantly
lower than those of men. The gap is larger for the self-employed than for the formally
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Table 4 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the gap in the average probability of having an
informal sector job
Self-employed and Self-employed Without a contract
without a contract
A: W=1 coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. %
Rural migrants vs.
urban residents
Difference 0.337 0.002 0.087 0.001 0.250 0.002
Explained 0.059 0.001 17 0.035 0.001 41 0.023 0.001 9
Unexplained 0.279 0.002 83 0.051 0.001 59 0.227 0.002 91
Urbanmigrants vs.
urban residents
Difference 0.166 0.003 0.057 0.002 0.109 0.003
Explained 0.028 0.001 17 -0.005 0.001 -9 0.034 0.001 31
Unexplained 0.138 0.003 83 0.062 0.002 109 0.075 0.003 69
Urbanmigrants vs.
rural migrants
Difference -0.171 0.004 -0.030 0.002 -0.141 0.003
Explained -0.087 0.003 51 -0.006 0.003 20 -0.081 0.003 57
Unexplained -0.085 0.005 49 -0.024 0.003 80 -0.061 0.005 43
Non-recent migrants
Difference -0.191 0.006 -0.072 0.005 -0.119 0.006
Explained -0.100 0.006 52 -0.048 0.005 66 -0.052 0.006 44
Unexplained -0.092 0.008 48 -0.024 0.007 34 -0.067 0.008 56
Recent migrants
Difference -0.162 0.004 -0.015 0.003 -0.147 0.004
Explained -0.079 0.004 49 0.007 0.003 -46 -0.086 0.004 59
Unexplained -0.082 0.006 51 -0.022 0.004 146 -0.060 0.006 41
B: W=0 coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. %
Rural migrants vs.
urban residents
Difference 0.337 0.002 0.087 0.001 0.250 0.002
Explained 0.047 0.004 14 -0.093 0.003 -107 0.140 0.004 56
Unexplained 0.291 0.004 86 0.180 0.003 207 0.111 0.004 44
Urbanmigrants vs.
urban residents
Difference 0.166 0.003 0.057 0.002 0.109 0.003
Explained -0.034 0.004 -21 -0.067 0.002 -117 0.033 0.003 30
Unexplained 0.200 0.005 121 0.124 0.003 217 0.076 0.004 70
Urbanmigrants vs.
rural migrants
Difference -0.171 0.004 -0.030 0.002 -0.141 0.003
Explained -0.098 0.004 57 -0.028 0.003 94 -0.070 0.004 50
Unexplained -0.073 0.005 43 -0.002 0.003 6 -0.071 0.005 50
Non-recent migrants
Difference -0.191 0.006 -0.072 0.005 -0.119 0.006
Explained -0.086 0.007 45 -0.048 0.005 67 -0.038 0.006 32
Unexplained -0.105 0.009 55 -0.024 0.007 33 -0.081 0.008 68
Recent migrants
Difference -0.162 0.004 -0.015 0.003 -0.147 0.004
Explained -0.105 0.005 65 -0.021 0.003 138 -0.085 0.005 58
Unexplained -0.056 0.006 35 0.006 0.004 -38 -0.062 0.006 42
The decomposition results are based on a linear probability model.
The sample includes individuals aged 16–60 years and who are out of school.
Observations with no or zero income declared were dropped.
Results in panel A (W=1) are calculated based on the counterfactual X¯mβˆu , and those in panel B (W=0) based on X¯uβˆm .
Source: 1% population survey of China (2005).
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Table 5 OLS income regression results: dependent variable=log (hourly income)
Formal contract Self-employed Without a contract
A: Urban residents
Age 0.034*** 0.017*** 0.020***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.161*** -0.259*** -0.189***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004)
Junior middle school 0.372*** 0.121*** 0.213***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.010)
Senior middle school 0.650*** 0.233*** 0.483***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.010)
College and above 1.070*** 0.573*** 1.021***
(0.009) (0.023) (0.010)
Unmarried -0.009 -0.065*** -0.075***
(0.007) (0.019) (0.008)
R-squared 0.349 0.127 0.368
N 128509 25832 65371
B: Rural migrants
Age 0.039*** 0.021*** 0.037***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.181*** -0.293*** -0.194***
(0.006) (0.011) (0.004)
Junior middle school 0.195*** 0.170*** 0.160***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.006)
Senior middle school 0.441*** 0.279*** 0.349***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.008)
College and above 0.948*** 0.527*** 0.746***
(0.018) (0.058) (0.019)
Unmarried -0.022** -0.025 -0.049***
(0.010) (0.022) (0.007)
R-squared 0.213 0.127 0.195
N 32947 16536 45138
C: Urbanmigrants
Age 0.077*** 0.006 0.049***
(0.005) (0.012) (0.005)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.187*** -0.229*** -0.162***
(0.012) (0.028) (0.013)
Junior middle school 0.252*** 0.189*** 0.177***
(0.040) (0.047) (0.030)
Senior middle school 0.532*** 0.348*** 0.419***
(0.040) (0.049) (0.030)
College and above 1.089*** 0.687*** 0.916***
(0.040) (0.059) (0.032)
Unmarried 0.025 0.157*** -0.003
(0.017) (0.051) (0.020)
R-squared 0.382 0.175 0.340
N 11482 3272 7460
Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Samples include those aged 16–60 years old and who are out of school.
Observations with no or zero income declared were dropped.
Province dummies and a constant are included in the regressions but not reported.
Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Source: 1% population survey of China (2005).
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employed and workers without a formal labour contract, but there are only small differ-
ences in coefficients among urban residents, rural migrants, and urban migrants along
gender lines.
Using these results, an OB decomposition is computed between rural migrants and
urban residents. The results are shown in the first three columns of Table 6. If the type of
Table 6 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of income gaps
Urban residents Rural migrants Urban residents
vs. rural migrants vs. urbanmigrants vs. urbanmigrants
A: W=1 coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. %
Total difference Difference 0.238 0.002 -0.488 0.006 -0.250 0.006
Explained 0.232 0.003 97 -0.255 0.005 52 -0.078 0.003 31
Unexplained 0.006 0.003 3 -0.233 0.006 48 -0.172 0.005 69
Formal employment Difference 0.252 0.004 -0.604 0.008 -0.351 0.008
Explained 0.220 0.004 87 -0.351 0.008 58 -0.141 0.005 40
Unexplained 0.033 0.005 13 -0.252 0.009 42 -0.210 0.007 60
Self employed Difference -0.096 0.007 -0.236 0.015 -0.333 0.015
Explained -0.096 0.006 100 -0.032 0.009 14 -0.110 0.007 33
Unexplained 0.000 0.008 0 -0.204 0.016 86 -0.222 0.014 67
No contract Difference 0.153 0.004 -0.302 0.008 -0.149 0.008
Explained 0.212 0.004 139 -0.150 0.006 50 -0.003 0.006 2
Unexplained -0.060 0.005 -39 -0.152 0.008 50 -0.146 0.007 98
Recent migrants Difference 0.267 0.003 -0.475 0.007 -0.208 0.007
Explained 0.257 0.003 96 -0.253 0.005 53 -0.060 0.004 29
Unexplained 0.010 0.003 4 -0.222 0.007 47 -0.148 0.005 71
Non recent migrants Difference 0.160 0.004 -0.510 0.011 -0.350 0.011
Explained 0.163 0.003 102 -0.246 0.009 48 -0.120 0.006 34
Unexplained -0.003 0.004 -2 -0.264 0.012 52 -0.230 0.009 66
B: W=0 coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. % coef. s.e. %
Total difference Difference 0.238 0.002 -0.488 0.006 -0.250 0.006
Explained 0.168 0.005 71 -0.317 0.007 65 -0.157 0.006 63
Unexplained 0.070 0.005 29 -0.171 0.007 35 -0.094 0.006 37
Formal employment Difference 0.252 0.004 -0.604 0.008 -0.351 0.008
Explained 0.228 0.008 90 -0.414 0.010 69 -0.211 0.009 60
Unexplained 0.025 0.008 10 -0.190 0.011 31 -0.140 0.009 40
Self employed Difference -0.096 0.007 -0.236 0.015 -0.333 0.015
Explained -0.059 0.006 62 -0.053 0.015 22 -0.141 0.010 42
Unexplained -0.037 0.009 38 -0.184 0.019 78 -0.192 0.015 58
No contract Difference 0.153 0.004 -0.302 0.008 -0.149 0.008
Explained 0.111 0.007 73 -0.185 0.009 61 -0.102 0.009 69
Unexplained 0.042 0.007 27 -0.117 0.010 39 -0.047 0.010 31
Recent migrants Difference 0.267 0.003 -0.475 0.007 -0.208 0.007
Explained 0.175 0.005 66 -0.324 0.008 68 -0.135 0.007 65
Unexplained 0.092 0.006 34 -0.151 0.008 32 -0.073 0.007 35
Non recent migrants Difference 0.160 0.004 -0.510 0.011 -0.350 0.011
Explained 0.117 0.009 73 -0.289 0.012 57 -0.232 0.011 66
Unexplained 0.044 0.010 27 -0.221 0.014 43 -0.118 0.012 34
Notes: Results are based on the income regressions of Tables 5.
Samples include those aged 16–60 years old and who are out of school.
Observations with no or zero income declared were dropped.









Source: 1% population survey of China (2005).
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employment sector is not taken into account, nearly all of the income gap (97%) between
rural migrants and urban residents can be attributed to differences in observed individ-
ual characteristics. If we use an alternative counterfactual income (X¯uβˆm), the explained
share will decrease, but still as high as 70%. Running separate OB decompositions for each
sector does not alter the results by much. According to these OB decompositions, the gap
between rural migrants and urban residents is mainly due to differences in human capital.
The results may again be the net effect of a premium accrued from migration and dis-
crimination associated with a rural hukou status. Urbanmigrants with urban hukou status
are used to disentangle the two effects.
The middle three columns of Table 6 report OB decomposition results for the income
gap between rural and urban migrants, two groups that differ only in rural/urban hukou
status. The general results indicate that 52% of the income gap between these two
groups can be explained by observed differences in their individual characteristics and
48% remains unexplained. We also find some heterogeneity across sectors. In the for-
mal sector, observed differences in characteristics can explain 58% of the income gap
whereas in the group without formal contracts the share of explained gap is only 50%.
Amongst the self-employed workers, only 14% of the gap in this group can be explained
by observable individual characteristics, suggesting discrimination against rural hukou
status. These patterns remain if alternative counterfactual incomes are used (see panel B,
Table 6).
Urban migrants are then measured up against urban residents to evaluate discrimina-
tion associated with being a migrant (not registered locally) but with a non-agricultural
hukou status. Since urban migrants earn more than urban residents, the OB decomposi-
tion in the last three columns of Table 6 suggests that migrants do indeed gain a premium.
The decomposition exercise shows that 69% of the income difference is unexplained, on
average, between urban migrants and urban residents. But this result is sensitive to the
choice of the counterfactual income (it becomes 37% in panel B, Table 6). Moreover,
decomposition results broken down by sector show that the unexplained shares are 60%,
67% and 98% for workers in the formal sector, the self-employed, and workers with no
formal labour contract respectively. These unexplained shares become smaller in panel
B, but it is still safe to draw the conclusion that if urban migrants were treated the same
as urban residents, their incomes would decrease but would still be higher than those of
urban residents with the same observable characteristics.
There may be two reasons for this result. First, urban migrants are positively selected
in terms of unobservable characteristics. Second, urban migrants ask for compensation
for giving up secure jobs. Suppose an urban worker is considering a move to another city.
She must find a better job, otherwise she will not migrate. So compared to those who do
not migrate with identical characteristics, she must have a higher income to compensate
for the hukou related benefits she gives up.
To investigate the effect of hukou status on discrimination more deeply, we look across
the income distribution to see if the effect differs at different points. Panel A of Figure 1
shows the actual income distributions of rural migrants and urban residents and the
counterfactual distribution supposing rural migrants were paid as if they were urban res-
idents. To obtain the counterfactual distribution, we first run a probit model including
both rural migrants and urban residents with the dependent variable equalling 1 if the
individual is an urban resident. The predicted weights ρˆ = (1 − pˆ)/pˆ are then applied to
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Figure 1 Factual and counterfactual distributions and percentiles, DFL approach. A: rural migrants vs.
urban residents (densities). B: rural migrants vs. urban residents (percentiles). C: rural migrants vs. urban
migrants (densities). D: rural migrants vs. urban migrants (percentiles).
the urban resident sample. The results indicate that even if rural migrants were paid like
urban residents according to their observable characteristics, their average income level
would not increase significantly. This is consistent with the OB decomposition results.
However, their income dispersion would increase. This means that rural migrants in the
upper half of the income distribution would earn higher incomes, while those at the lower
half would earn less. This pattern is also clear in panel B of Figure 1, where the actual and
counterfactual percentiles are reported. For the middle level percentiles, the actual and
counterfactual income levels for rural migrants are not significantly different.
We also compare rural migrants with urban migrants (rather than urban residents)
using the DFL approach to construct counterfactual distributions. Results, shown in Panel
C and D of Figure 1, indicate that if rural migrants were paid like urban migrants, their
income distribution would move further to the right, but remain lower than the distribu-
tion of urban migrants. This effect is larger for individuals in the upper half of the income
distribution.
In conclusion, there seems to be some, although not overwhelming support for discrim-
ination against those with rural hukou status, while there seems to be more support for a
premium garnered by being a migrant.
5.3 Does migration duration matter?
The Harris and Todaro (1970) framework suggests that migrants may first enter the infor-
mal labour market, accumulating experience before obtaining an opportunity for a formal
sector job. The income premium earned by migrants observed above likely varies accord-
ing to the amount of time migrants have spent in the urban labour market. In order to
evaluate this labour market assimilation effect, we separate migrant samples according to
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their duration in the urban labour market and then investigate the differences in the dis-
tribution by job type and income, as in the exercises presented earlier. To define the two
groups, we use a cutoff of 5 years in the urban labour market.12
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. For both rural and urban migrants, the
duration of their migration episode is important. More than 70% of migrants (rural and
urban) have less than 5 years of local urban living experience. Both rural and urban self-
employed migrants tend to have resided longer in the host labour market, while workers
with no formal labour contract tend to be more recent arrivals.
The first two columns in Table 7 present the distribution by job type for both recent
and non-recent rural migrants. Job type changes significantly as urban area experi-
ence increases, but most changes happen within the informal sector. The share of rural
migrants in the formal sector remains almost unchanged. On the other hand, the share
of self-employed migrants increases from 14% to 26%. The pattern for urban migrants
is similar to that of rural migrants. Despite the increase in urban area experience, the
probability of an urban migrant having a formal sector job only increases slightly (by
2 percentage points). The share of self-employed migrants, however, increases from
13% to 18%.
Table 8 reports results from amultinomial logit model based on job type for both recent
and non-recent migrants, showing that the probability of being self-employed increases
as people age. It is therefore expected that if recent migrants (both rural and urban) are
treated as non-recent migrants, a greater number of them will be self-employed, but the
share of formal sector employment will remain relatively unchanged. The results suggest
that although migration duration matters for the type of jobs held by migrants, it plays
a minor role in helping migrants obtain a formal sector job. In addition, the OB decom-
position based on a linear probability model in Table 4 suggests that the discrimination
against rural migrants does not decrease with duration in an urban area. We reach this
conclusion by comparing rural and urban migrants with the same amount of urban area
experience, and the results indicate that the unexplained part of the gap (both in terms of
absolute difference and in relative share) does not decrease.
We also look at the determinants of income for rural and urban migrants depending on
duration, and the results are reported in Table 9. For recent migrants, incomes increase
relatively more quickly and the gap between women and men is lower. These results com-
bined with those in Table 5 are used to performOB decompositions. The results in Table 6
indicate that most of the income gap between both recent and non-recent migrants and
Table 7 Sectoral distribution of migrants based onmultinomial logit model (bymigration
duration)
Rural migrants Urbanmigrants
Actual distribution Predicted distribution Actual distribution Predicted distribution
Non-recent Recent Recent as Non-recent Recent Recent as
non-recent non-recent
Formal contract 34 35 36 53 51 54
Self-employed 26 14 18 18 13 15
Without contract 41 50 46 29 36 32
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Samples include individuals aged 16–60 years and who are out of school.
Observations of migrants who migrated for reasons not related to employment were dropped.
Source: 1% population survey of China (2005).
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Table 8Marginal effects of multinomial logit results (bymigration duration)
Rural migrants Non-recent Recent
Self-employed No contract Self-employed No contract
Age 0.129*** -0.013 0.127*** -0.028***
(0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.007)
Age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.382*** -0.079** -0.612*** -0.169***
(0.039) (0.032) (0.028) (0.018)
Junior middle school -0.486*** -0.413*** -0.590*** -0.526***
(0.044) (0.039) (0.035) (0.027)
Senior middle school -1.000*** -0.903*** -1.057*** -0.988***
(0.059) (0.050) (0.048) (0.033)
College and above -2.325*** -1.351*** -1.615*** -1.428***
(0.197) (0.107) (0.123) (0.065)
Unmarried -0.701*** 0.286*** -1.211*** -0.020
(0.079) (0.051) (0.050) (0.028)
N 25482 69139
Urbanmigrants Non-recent Recent
Self-employed No contract Self-employed No contract
Age 0.124*** -0.036 0.156*** -0.081***
(0.036) (0.028) (0.025) (0.015)
Age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.084 0.086 -0.123** 0.113***
(0.078) (0.062) (0.057) (0.037)
Junior middle school -0.314** -0.269* -0.569*** -0.413***
(0.144) (0.139) (0.124) (0.108)
Senior middle school -1.024*** -0.759*** -1.287*** -1.032***
(0.147) (0.139) (0.125) (0.108)
College and above -2.089*** -1.394*** -2.346*** -1.724***
(0.169) (0.145) (0.137) (0.110)
Unmarried -0.455*** 0.314*** -0.884*** 0.154***
(0.145) (0.088) (0.097) (0.055)
N 6608 15606
Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Samples include individuals aged 16–60 years and who are out of school.
Migrants that migrated for reasons not related to employment were dropped.
The base category in the multinomial logit is formal employment.
Regional dummies are included in the regressions but not reported.
Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Source: 1% population survey of China (2005).
urban residents is still due to observable characteristics. By comparing rural and urban
migrants, the unexplained part of the income gap between the two groups does not
decrease as duration in an urban area increases.
These results regarding duration spent in an urban area indicate that discrimination,
both for job type and income, does not decrease as duration in urban areas for migrants
increases.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, a nationally representative sample of individuals is used to investigate
whether migrants are discriminated in terms of income and out of jobs with formal labour
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Table 9 OLS income regression results bymigration duration: dependent variable=log
(hourly income)
Rural migrants Urbanmigrants
Non-recent Recent Non-recent Recent
Age 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.065***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004)
Age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.283*** -0.167*** -0.237*** -0.168***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.018) (0.010)
Junior middle school 0.180*** 0.184*** 0.208*** 0.229***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.038) (0.027)
Senior middle school 0.406*** 0.404*** 0.462*** 0.511***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.038) (0.027)
College and above 0.955*** 0.863*** 1.094*** 1.072***
(0.028) (0.014) (0.039) (0.028)
Unmarried -0.076*** -0.012* -0.035 0.047***
(0.013) (0.006) (0.026) (0.015)
R-squared 0.206 0.181 0.394 0.379
N 25482 69139 6608 15606
Notes: *, **, and *** represent significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
The dependent variable is the log of hourly income.
Samples include those aged 16–60 years old and who are out of school.
Observations with no or zero income declared were dropped.
Province dummies and a constant are included in the regressions but not reported.
Standard errors are reported in brackets.
Source: 1% population survey of China (2005).
contracts in the urban labour market in China. It contributes to the existing literature
in several important ways. First, as opposed to other papers investigating discrimination
in China, the data are nationally representative and provide a better coverage of rural
and urban migrants. Second, it distinguishes between rural and urban migrants in order
to independently identify discrimination against rural hukou status and discrimination
against non-local hukou status. Third, it breaks down jobs according to whether they
include formal labour contracts, and differentiates between those without a formal labour
contract and self-employed workers.
An OB decomposition of the fitted probability of having an informal sector job shows
that migrants (both rural and urban) are discriminated against for jobs with formal labour
contracts. The extent of discrimination is larger for rural migrants indicating further
discrimination against those with rural hukou status.
A comparison of rural migrants and urban residents shows that nearly all of the income
gap can be explained by differences in individual characteristics, suggesting that discrim-
ination is almost negligible. A comparison between rural migrants and urban migrants,
isolating the migration effect but not the rural/urban hukou status effect, shows that 40%
of the income gap is unexplained by observed characteristics. By comparing instead urban
migrants with urban residents, this time isolating the hukou effect (agricultural/non-
agricultural), we find evidence of discrimination in income. Since urban migrants earn
the most of all groups, we therefore presume that the absence of discrimination from the
comparison between rural migrants and urban residents is a net effect of discrimination
against rural hukou status and a premium accrued generally by migrating.
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There are limitations in the approach taken in this paper. The first is in the choice
of the appropriate reference group. Although this paper takes a step forward by using
urban migrants as an additional reference group, there may be unobservable characteris-
tics between rural migrants and urban migrants. Moreover, while self-selection into the
labour force could be dealt with in this paper, another source of endogeneity may stem
from choice of sector. In fact, the results of our OB decompositions for urban migrants
suggests that the self-employed may indeed be self-selected.
The policy implications of our results suggest that, since rural migrants enjoy a pre-
mium as migrants yet face discrimination at the same time, the reason they may be
worse off when compared to urban residents is due to their lower levels of human capital.
Increasing the education levels of rural migrants and providing them with training and
relevant urban labour market skills will help increase their earning opportunities. As both
rural and urban migrants face discrimination in access to jobs with formal labour con-
tracts, reforming the labour market, notably removing barriers to accessing public goods,
may help migrants access better jobs.
This study suggests evidence of discrimination in the urban labour market against those
with rural hukou status. In addition, migrants without social security coverage face high
costs for health services. In terms of schooling and childcare, many migrants leave their
children home in the rural parts of China, in effect putting more pressure on household
members left-behind and adding to the already existing social strain caused by migration.
Hence it is important to ensure that migrants have access to basic social services, even in
cases where they are employed informally.
Endnotes
1The ratio in 2007, for instance, was 3.3 to 1 (China Statistical Yearbook, National
Bureau of Statistics of China 2008).
2This number is only slightly below the number of total international migrants in the
world, which in 2005 was estimated at 191 million (United Nations 2009).
3This analysis depends on the assumption that people with different hukou
registrations have the same (unobserved) ability. However, people with local hukou have
higher innate ability (this may be true, for example, for those who obtained hukou
through special achievement). In this case, the income gap would be a lower estimate for
the true hukou premium. It might also be true that people born with local hukou status
have lower ability or less entrepreneurial spirit compared to migrants without local
hukou status. These possibilities need to be taken into consideration when interpreting
results.
4The major difference between the formal and informal sector comes from non-wage
benefits, which are hard to quantify. For example, formal jobs are more secure, offer
better conditions and benefits which may not be reflected in the wage. Workers may
even be willing to accept a lower wage to have a formal sector job. These aspects cannot
be dealt with using the Brown et al. (1980) method. We also decompose the income gaps
using the Brown method and the results are similar to those obtained using the regular
OB decomposition.
5The China Urban Labor Survey covers only five cities: Shanghai, Wuhan, Shenyang,
Fuzhou, and Xian, all of which are provincial capitals.
6Cities (shiqu) refer to the city proper of regions of different administrative levels.
Prefecture-level cities or higher level cities directly controlled by the central government
usually govern surrounding counties, including rural areas. In cases of county level
cities, city proper refers to the areas where the county government is located and some
nearby neighbourhoods. Towns (zhen) refer to where the town level government is
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located. Zhen is a level of administrative government approved by higher level
government. In Chinese statistics, urban (or chengzhen) refers to city and town. Villages
(xiangcun) refer to rural areas.
7The contracts should have the following terms: the term (length) of the contract;
tasks; working time and vacations allocated; compensation; social security (such as
unemployment insurance; pension; medical insurance; and housing). Some employers
(usually in the private sector) do not sign contracts mainly to circumvent the need to pay
insurance for employees.
8We also calculate the OB decomposition using an alternative counterfactual income
X¯uβˆm, the gap can then be decomposed into:
(
X¯u − X¯m) βˆm + (βˆu − βˆm) X¯u.
9 Similarly, we can construct an alternative counterfactual distribution for the
decomposition: θ cf 1(W ) = ∫ f u(W |X)φm(X)dX.
10By running quantile regressions at different quantiles using data of urban residents,
we obtain a detailed description of its conditional distribution. The estimated skill price
structure (conditional distribution) can then be applied to data (skill distribution) of rural
migrants by multiplying the quantile coefficient matrix of urban residents by the data
matrix of rural migrants. This approach estimates the conditional distribution explicitly,
with some risk of imposing strong restrictions on its structure. No effort is needed to
estimate the composition change parametrically. Chernozhukov et al. 2013 show that
the quantile approach and DFL reweighting approach are equally valid under correct
specifications. We choose DFL because it is computationally fast. We also tried to use the
QR approach to construct the counterfactual distributions. They produce similar results.
11We also do exercises controlling for industry and occupation dummies, and both the
regression results and the decomposition results are similar to those without controlling
for industry and occupation.
12We also use a 3-year cutoff as a robustness check, and the results are similar.
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